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Abstract
The concept of social capital has gained attention as a source of support in implementing Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES). Environmental services, in the context of better water yields in watersheds, is 
affected by good land cover conditions of forests including small-scale private owned forests. Although some 
research results indicate that private owned forests are more economic oriented than environmental functions, but its 
existing social capital ​​can be harnessed to implement PES in small-scale forests. The aim of this study was to analyze 
the potential of social capital as a source of support in the implementation of PES. The research was conducted by 
survey method. This research revealeds that the level of trust in local community leaders is very high. This role 
models can be an key entry point for realizing the PES scheme by strengthening the common knowledge of 
environmental benefits of small-scale forests and strengthen community norms related to the protection of water 
resources. Leadership and networking capabilities of the community institution leader give a real influence in 
collaboration between groups.
Keywords:  small scale forests, payment for environmental services, social capital, community institution
 *Correspondence author, email:   nparlinah@forda-mof.org, tel.: +62-251-8633234, fax. +62-251 - 8638111
Introduction
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) programs in 
various countries have been implemented to provide 
financial incentives for conservation of forest and reduction 
of deforestation (Kosoy et al. 2007; Engel et al. 2008; 
Muradian et al. 2010). PES is defined as a voluntary 
transaction between service users and service providers 
depend on agreed rules on natural resource management to 
produce services (Wunder 2015). The transfer of resources 
between social actors aims to create incentives to harmonize 
individual and/or collective land use decisions with social 
interests in natural resource management (Muradian et al. 
2010). The Regional Forum on Payment Schemes for 
Environmental Services in Watersheds (2004) defines PES as 
a compensation payment of environmental services to 
service providers by users of environmental services. PES 
schemes in watersheds are the implementation of market 
mechanisms to compensate for upland landowners to 
maintain or modify certain land uses, which affect the 
availability and/or quality of water resources downstream.  
The existence of forest has benefited to arrange the water 
system, sedimentation process, and the water flow during the 
dry season (Junaidi & Tarigan 2011).  There is a significant 
relationship between land use and water quality parameters.   
The more forested a watershed is, the less sediment and 
nutrients load to the stream (Kibena et al. 2014). 
Small scale private owned forests are part of land use in 
the catchment area. The existence of small scale forests 
provide economic benefits to the owners and provide 
environmental benefits to other parties. The economic 
benefits contribute to farmer income (Hardjanto 2001; 
Darusman & Hardjanto 2006), while environmental 
benefits, e.g., maintaining the water source discharge 
(Widarti 2015) benefited by the wider community. Main 
motivation of the smallholder in developing the forests, 
especially in Java Island, is economic reasons (Lastini 2012; 
Nugroho & Tiryana 2013).
In order to assure that the environmental benefits of small 
scale forests can be benefited on a wider scale, it requires 
policy interventions through PES mechanisms. PES is an 
approach to resolve externalities in achieving environmental 
and conservation goals (Ajayi et al. 2012). PES also 
internalizes the positive externalities of uncompensated 
environmental services (Kerr et al. 2007). This approach is 
included in an economic incentive-based arrangement (Yin 
et al. 2013); a policy designed to influence or motivates 
individuals and communities to perform certain actions 
(Emerton 1999).
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Implementation of PES mechanisms requires 
collaboration and collective action including from forest 
owner. Linking environmental service schemes into local 
(rural) institutions can promote equitable outcomes, 
primarily through collective action to lower transaction costs 
and reduce the barriers to smallholder participation 
(Beckmann & Padmanabhan 2009). Voluntary collaboration 
among the people will be easier if the people already have 
social capital (Putnam et al. 1993). According to Liu et al. 
(2014), high level of social capital, particularly the cognitive 
variant, is instrumental in encouraging residents' pro 
environmental behaviors.  Social capital is also important for 
crafting and implementing PES schemes that ensure the 
provision of environmental services and distribute benefits 
fairly within the communities (Rosa et al. 2004).  Mauthe et 
al. (2015) states that social capital can in turn directly affect 
natural capital by facilitating collective action and effective 
ecosystem management. Social capital refers to the features 
of social organizations such as trusts, norms, and networks 
(Putnam et al. 1993). It is not just meant as cohesiveness of 
social relations within an institution or community group, but 
it is also viewed more broadly as something that makes 
societies aligned and united in order to achieve common 
goals (Fukuyama 2007). Social capital and its components 
have become social glue that will keep the unity of group 
members (Djohan 2008). Farmer group, as community 
institutions, is one reflection of collective action in the 
community.  Community action has a correlation with 
bonding and bridging social capital (Agnitsch et al. 2006).  
As an example, the farmers’ groups are able to facilitate 
collective actions in implementation of activities related to 
agriculture, forestry, and livestock. 
Putnam (2000) distinguish between bonding and bridging 
social capital.  Bonding social capital refers to trust and 
strong ties within homogenous groups, whereas bridging 
social capital refers to diverse network and link between 
groups.  Linking social capital refers to the link between 
individuals and groups in hierarchical relationships 
(Woolcock 2001). The purpose of the research is to analyze 
the potential of social capital in the form of trust, norm, and 
network and community engagement as a source of support 
in the development of PES (Putnam et al. 1993; Acquaah et 
al. 2014) 
Methods
Location and time  The research was conducted in four (4) 
villages located in Jatigede catchment area, part of Cimanuk 
Watershed (Figure 1).  Cimanuk Watershed is located in the 
region of four regencies i.e. Garut, Sumedang, Majalengka 
and Indramayu, West Java Province.  The villages were taken 
from several sub basins resulting from Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool program which is closest to Jatigede 
Reservoir.  Field data collection was conducted from June 
2016 until January 2017.
Data collection  This study used survey method involving 
questionnaires.  The respondent unit was smallholder 
household. As many as 135 respondents were selected 
purposively (3% of the households, from 4 sample villages).  
In order to assess more detailed information regarding small 
scale forests management and community institution, in-
depth interviews with several informants were also 
conducted.  Data on distribution and population density of 
the villages were derived from Sumedang Central Bureau of 
Statistics (2016) and Garut's Central Bureau of Statistic 
(2016).  Data of small-scale forests in each village were 
analyzed based on the 2015s’ land cover maps obtained from 
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
Data analysis  Social capital concept from Putnam (1993) 
was used as basic theoretical framework in the reserch.  
Social capital variables measured were trust, norms, and 
networking (Putnam et al. 1993) including civic engagement 
(Acquaah et al. 2014). The analysis was implemented by 
comparing the score (based on the Likert scale) of social 
capital variables.  Classification of the score was undertaken 
by using hose value formula (Supranto 2000).  The number 
of classes are divided into three classes (low, medium, and 
high) which is adjusted to the desired level of categories.
 Statistical analysis of social capital variables (trust, 
norms, networking) was used in this study non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test to determine whether there is a 
significant difference for each variable of social capital. 
Multiple pairwise comparisons using Dunn test were used in 
the next step to know the difference of social capital variable 
between villages. To assess the effectiveness of social capital 
in encouraging collective action to develop PES by utilizing 
existing community institutions, eight principles of the 
effective institutional design according to Ostrom (1990) 
was emloyed. The principles are clearly defined boundaries, 
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and 
local condition, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, 
graduated sanction, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
minimal recognition of rights to organize, and nested 
enterprises.
Results and Discussion
Small-scale private forests in research site The water 
catchment area of Jatigede Dam (based on the SWAT 
program delineation at the outlet point of Cimanuk-Wado 
  
 
Figure 1 Research location on four villages of Jatigede. 
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Water Station (S6 57 and E108 05')) is 127 674 ha. Tenurial 
status of the land in the location is mostly dominated by 
private land (73.3%), and the rest is state forest area. In 2003, 
total area of small scale private forests (forest land owned 
privately by farmer, usually an area less then 1 ha with a 
separate location) contributed 21.5% to the type of land use 
on private land. Total area of small scale forests declined in 
2012 and 2015 to become 20.9% and 9.2% respectively 
( ).  The dynamics of land cover on small scale forests Table 1
(together with other land cover) have had an effect on the 
hydrological function of annual water yield as monitored at 
the Cimanuk-Wado Water Station (Table 1).
 Based on analysis of land cover maps of 2015 from the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry (overlaid with an 
administrative map), the potential of small scale forests in 
Cilengkrang, Ganjaresik, Cisitu, and Cilampuyang villages 
have a high potential and relatively stable during 2003 to 
2015 ( ).  The village with the highest forest area in Table 2
2015 was Cilengkrang which was 444.08 ha. While the least 
was Ganjaresik with 40.63 ha. Comparing with the area of 
small scale forest between 2003 and 2015, the forests in 
Ganjaresik and Cilampuyang villages were stable.  On the 
other side,  the forest decresed by 7.97% (38.48 ha) in 
Cilengkrang Village and increased by 15.20% (48.73 ha) in 
Cisitu Village. 
 Planting pattern applied by the smallholder in the 
research location is dominated by forest tree stands and 
combination between timber and agriculture crops or known 
as agroforestry system. Most selected types of wood plants 
are fast growing species such as sengon (Paraserianthes 
falcataria), gmelina (Gmelina arborea Roxb), acacia 
(Acacia sp.), and jabon (Anthocephalus sp.).  For slow 
growing species, mahogany (Swietenia sp.) is the most 
preferred species.  On the average, timber harvesting for fast 
growing species is five years, although some farmers harvest 
their trees when the plants is stillyoung (less than five years 
old) or more due to financial necessity. For slow growing 
species such as mahogany, the farmers generally cut down 
the trees when the plants are 15 years old or even older. The 
location of forest tree stands is found generally on Cimanuk 
riverbanks and on areas with high slope. The description of 
the condition of small scale forests in the research site is 
presented in .Figure 2
 Population density in all four villages was categorized as 
medium (251−400 people km ) to very high (> 401 people 
-2
km ) ( ). The majority of the population worked as 
-2
Table 3
farmers. As described earlier, cropping pattern commonly 
found in the research area was forest tree stands and 
agroforestry. However, there was also area managed for 
paddy fields and agricultural crops cultivation. The 
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Table 1 The effect of land use change on hydrological 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Land status/discharge
 
Year
 
2003
 
2009
 
2012
 
2015
State forests (ha) 
  
34,077.71 
 
34,077.71 
 
34,077.71 34,077.71 
Non-state forests (ha) 
  
93,596.29 
 
93,596.29 
 
93,596.29 93,596.29 
 
Small scale private forests
 
20,148.09 
 
20,563.38 
 
19,649.43 8,580.42 
 
Estate crop
 
370.94 
 
397.47 
 
397.47 214.41 
 
Settlement areas
 
8,704.52 
 
8,728.22 
 
8,728.22 8,768.49 
 
Dry agricultural land
 
34,273.45 
 
34,755.19 
 
35,669.14 50,819.43 
 
Paddy field
 
29,917.32 
 
28,970.84 
 
28,970.84 25,075.62 
 
Non-forest dry shrub
 
44.11 
 
44.11 
 
44.11 - 
Bare ground
 
129.69 
 
128.90 
 
128.90 129.76  
Open water
 
8.16
  
8.16 
 
8.16 8.16 
Sum (ha)
 
127,674.00 
 
127,674.00 
 
127,674.00 127,674.00 
Debit (m
3  
yr
-1)
 
775,054,656 
 
870,589,728 
 
1,181,632,320 
Table 2 Distribution of small-scale private forests in research site
   
 
 
Regency Sub District Villages
Small-scale forests area (ha) in year
2003
 
2015
Sumedang
 
Wado
 
Cilengkrang
 
482.56
 
444.08
 
Ganjaresik
 
40.63
 
40.63
Garut Malangbong  Cisitu  320.61  369.34
 
Cilampuyang
 
212.06
 
212.06
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frequency of rice harvest was generally 2−3 times per year, 
while the harvest of agricultural crops depends on the planted 
species. The agriculture crops planting pattern was generally 
a mixture of various types of crops such as corn, peanuts, 
ginger, and cassava.
Social capital performance  Most of the people in 
Cilengkrang, Ganjaresik, Cisitu, and Cilampuyang villages 
were Sundanese. Residents coming from other areas or other 
tribes such as Java, Betawi, and Minang can adapt to local 
customs and norms so that they can be get along well with the 
local community. Social capital variables i.e. trust, norm, and 
networking can be seen in everyday life. The analysis of 
social capital variables indicated that trust and norm in all 
four villages was high.  For networking variable, Ganjaresik 
Village had medium value, while the other three villages had 
high value ( ).  The aggregate value indicates that all Table 4
four Villages had high social capital.  Ganjaresik village has 
the lowest social capital value compared to other villages, 
and Cisitu Village had the highest value of social capital.
Trust  The attitude of mutual trust, strong belief in local 
leaders (religious leaders), and mutual cooperation in various 
activities are a reflection of trust value in the community 
(disscussing about participation and its relation to social 
capital and collective action). Participation in activities is not 
only in the form of labor such as participating in the 
construction of houses or improving public facilities (such as 
roads and irrigation channels), but also in the form of 
donations of objects such as wood to build a worship place 
and school.
 Analysis on trust variable by using Kruskal-Wallis 
nonparametric test shows that there was no significant 
difference among the four villages ( ). This can be seen Table 5
from the value of p-value (0.0661) which is greater than  = α
0.05 (95% significance level). Indicators used to assess the 
variable of trust are trust to other people from similar ethnic 
group, from different ethnic group, outsiders, local leader, 
local government (village), government, partner institutions, 
trust maintain social glue and to cooperate in forest 
management. There is one indicator that respondents in the 
four villages give the same value (high) of trusting their local 
leader.  Religious leaders and elderly figures are those who 
are considered local leaders by the community.
 Further analysis using Dunn test ( ) shows that Table 6
there was a significant difference value of trust between 
Cilampuyang and Cisitu villages. The substantial difference 
in value of trust in Cilampuyang Village comes from lower 
trust indicators where people tend to be more cautious about 
people from different ethnic and people from outside the 
region. This indicates that bridging social capital of 
Cilampuyang Village is lower than Cisitu society. This is 
logical when looking at tribe diversity living in Cilampuyang 
Village. Result from interviews with respondents reveals that 
there were only two tribes in Cilampuyang Village i.e. 
Sundanese and Javanese.  Whereas in the other three 
villages, the population is more diverse. Villagers of 
Cilengkrang come from various tribes i.e. Sunda (majority), 
Java, Minang, and Betawi. Cilengkrang village is also 
residence for those who are affected by Jatigede Dam 
construction. Likewise, for Cisitu Village, people come from 
different tribes i.e. Sundanese (majority), Javanese, Betawi, 
Minang and Minahasa. Religion, in this case Islam becomes 
an important factor in the level of community acceptance in 
Cisitu Village. Different situation occurs in Ganjaresik 
Village, although there were only two tribes (Sundanese and 
Javanese), religion adherents in the village were Moslem and 
Christians. Whereas in the other villages, the majority of its 
population was Moslem.
Norms  The norms variable of social capital were tested 
based on seven indicators, namely the level of understanding 
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Figure 2  Small-scale private forests in research site. Cilengkrang community forest (a), Cilampuyang community forest (b).
Table 3 Population density of villages in research site
Villages
 
Total area 
   (km )
2
 
Total 
population
 
Population 
density
Cilengkrang 16.62 5,470  329
Ganjaresik
 
9.88
 
3,831
 
388
Cisitu 3.93 5,674 1,443
Cilampuyang 14.70 5,027 342  
(a) (b)
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Networking  Networking variables and civic engagement 
were assessed from 11 indicators i.e. diversity of ethnic in 
organization membership, diversity of age, diversity of 
education level, member participation in a group, 
willingness to establish networking voluntary, cooperation 
among groups within the community, cooperation with 
groups outside the community, organizational togetherness, 
collaboration in solving collective problems,  level of 
personal participation in the group, and number of 
organizations followed. Overall, there were significant 
differences between the four villages in terms of network 
variables as presented in . This can be seen from the Table 5
result of Kruskal-Wallis analysis where p-value value 
<0.0001 is less than α = 0.05 (95% significance level).
 The multiple pairwise comparisons Dunn test shows that 
there was no apparent difference in networking variables 
among villagers in Cilengkrang, Ganjaresik, and Cisitu 
villages (Table 8). Likewise, for Cilampuyang and Cisitu 
villages, there is no significant difference. The significant 
difference occured between villagers from Cilampuyang 
with the other two villages (Cilengkrang and Ganjaresik). 
Differences occur in indicators of cooperation with groups 
outside the community, where Cilampuyang Village has a 
higher indicator value. Related to indicator of cooperation 
with groups outside the community, the leadership and 
networking capabilities of the group leader plays a very 
important role.
 Considering the good performance of small scale forests 
supported by high social capital, it is a good chance for 
implementing PES scheme in the area.  PES can be one of the 
policy options applied so that small-scale forest owners are 
willing to preserve their forests.  PES can also be provided to 
of unwritten rules, written rules, religious rules, honesty 
norms, norms of decency, harmonious relations, and norms 
in land/forest utilization. The result of Kruskal-Wallis test of 
the seven indicators ( ) shows that there was a Table 5
significant difference of norm variable in the four villages (p-
value smaller than  0.05). A further test using multiple α
pairwise comparisons Dunn's shows that Cilampuyang 
Village has the lowest average value of norms variable, while 
Cisitu Village get the highest value ( ). Villagers of Table 7
Cilampuyang and Ganjaresik were not significantly different 
in terms of understanding the norm as a whole but they differ 
significantly from the other two villages. The most 
significant difference indicator in understanding the norms 
between Cilampuyang Village residents and other village 
residents was understanding of written rules. This condition 
indicates that unwritten rules are better understood by 
Cilampuyang Village community than that of written rules.  
This implies that unwritten norm is more effectively applied 
in daily life. The unwritten rules further increase control of 
the community and give space to the community to remind 
each other in complying with the norm.  
 The norms in the utilization of land and forests in the 
communities in the four villages re almost identical with we
the protection of water sources, which is among others done 
by planting wood, especially species that are considered to be 
able to bring water such as banyan (Ficus ),  benjamina bunut
( ),  ( ), ihujan ( ), Ficus glabela kiara Ficus sp k Albizia saman
and bamboo. The management of sloping land s done by wa
growing hardwood (timber), bamboo  and long term crops to ,
avoid landslides. Tre tment for sloping land s done by a wa
making terraces and hoeing in the opposite direction of the 
slope of the land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 5 Results of Kruskal-Wallis test on community's 
social capital
Kruskal-Wallis test Trust Norms Networking
K (Observed value) 7.1890 26.2752 30.2063
K (Critical value) 7.8147 7.8147
 
Table 4  Analysis of social capital element of respondents in research site
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
   
 
      
    
 
Criteria for social 
capita
 
Level of score
 Cilengkrang  
(N=36)
 
Ganjaresik  
(N=35)
 
Cisitu  
(N=31)
 
Cilampuyang
(N=33)  
Low
 
Medium 
 
High
     
 
Trust
 
<16.7
 
≥16.7 to <23.4
 
≥ 23.4
 
27.97
 
27.66
 
28.35
 
27.33
 
 
Norms
 
<11.6
 
≥11.6 to <16.2
 
≥ 16.2
 
20.19
 
18.89
 
20.32
 
19.00
 
 
Networking
 
<18.3
 
≥18.3 to <25.6
 
≥ 25.6
 
26.61
 
25.46
 
28.16
 
30.18
 
Total
 
<46.7
 
≥46.7 to <65.4
 
≥ 65.4
 
74.78
 
72.00
 
76.84
 
76.52
 
    
   
   
7.8147
DF
 
3
 
3
 
3
 
p-value (Two -tailed)
 
0.0661
 
< 0.0001
 
< 0.0001
 
alpha
 
0.05
 
0.05
 
0.05
 
Sample
 
Frequency
 
Sum of ranks
 
Mean of 
ranks  
Groups*
Cilampuyang 33  1835.5000
 
55.6212
 
A
 
Ganjaresik
 
35
 
2344.5000
 
66.9857
 
A
 
B
Cilengkrang
 
36
 
2483.5000
 
68.9861 A B
Cisitu 31 2516.5000 81.1774 B
Table 6 Multiple pairwise comparisons using Dunn's 
procedure/two-tailed test for “trust”
note: Letter A and B are a symbol for group which is the village having 
thesame letter has the same group
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Table 7 Multiple pairwise comparisons using Dunn's 
procedure/two-tailed test for “norms”
  
 
 
 
 
  
potential landowners to manage their land into small-scale 
forests. Environmental service incentives are offered to 
landowners whose decisions may be affected by economic 
rationality and other factors (van der Horst 2011).
 The effectiveness of the PES scheme, when it is 
implemented, can be predicted from the community response 
to the PES incentive offered for small-scale forests and 
incentives for agricultural land to be converted to small-scale 
forests ( ). PES incentives will effectively preserve Table 9
existing forests and avoid any change in management. Six 
percent of small-scale forest owners will change their 
landuse management into cropland management if there is no 
incentive offered. In addition, PES incentive offered will also 
change the form of cropland management into woodland or 
agroforestry which is owned by 26% of respondents.
 Some reasons mentioned by respondents of why 
incentives would prevent the rate of change of small-scale 
forest that were: (1) everyone needs wood, (2) small-scale 
forests have environmental benefits to prevent drought, 
erosion and landslides, and (3) small scale forest saves a lot 
of farming cost, and assure the fulfillment of daily needs. On 
the other hand, respondents willing to convert agricultural 
land into small-scale forest due to several resasons: (1) te 
land is located far from settlement and limited time 
availability, (2) many pests (monkeys) if the land is 
cultivated for crops, (3) provision of incentives, and (4) if not 
all the land is planted with forest trees. The results of this 
study confirm findings from Urquhart et al. (2012), who 
argued that landowners have different motivations and 
attitudes in managing their forests for the benefit of public 
service providers such as environmental services.
 Through PES schemes, multilayer benefits of small scale 
forestry will not only be accepted by local communities but it 
can also provide benefits on a wider scale for more 
beneficiaries.  On a larger scale, small-scale forests can 
significantly affect the control of annual water yields in 
watersheds. In order to increase the utilization of 
environmental benefits of forests on a wider scale, the 
potential of existing social capital should be encouraged to be 
a collective action to conserve existing forests while 
encouraging the development of more small-scale forests. 
According to Prisma (2003), social capital is an important 
element in landscape arrangement and the provision of 
environmental services.  
The design of payment for environmental services The 
design of payment for environmental services on the small-
scale private forest in water catchment areas of Jatigede 
reservoir can be designed with reference to the PES scheme 
of The Regional Forum on Payment Schemes for 
Environmental Services in Watersheds covering context, 
actors, valuation financing and costs, operation and design, 
and monitoring (Parlinah 2018).  It is further explained that 
the design of PES schemes that can be applied to small-scale 
forest in the catchment area of Jatigede Reservoir is:
1 PES context is intended to (1) maintain the quality and 
quantity of water in the catchments of Jatigede Reservoir, 
(2) additional sources of income for smallholder forest 
farmers, and (3) incentives in respect of maintaining the 
existence of the small-scale forests.  
2 Actors: The owner of small-scale forests is a provider of 
watershed protection services, while the buyers of 
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
Table 8 Multiple pairwise comparisons using Dunn's 
procedure/two-tailed test for “networking”
note: Letter A, B, and C are a symbol for group which is the village having 
the same letter has the same group
Sample
 
Frequency
 
Sum 
of ranks
 
Mean 
of ranks
 
Groups*
 
Cilampuyang
 
33
 
1540.5000
 
46.6818
 
A
   
 
Ganjaresik
 
35
 
2048.5000
 
58.5286
 
A
 
B
 
 
Cilengkrang
 
36
 
2876.0000
 
79.8889
   
B
 
C
 
Cisitu
 
31
 
2715.0000
 
87.5806
     
C
 
 
 
Sample
 
Frequency
 
Sum of 
ranks
Mean of 
ranks Groups*
Cilengkrang
 
36
 
1808.5000 50.2361 A
Ganjaresik
 
35
 
1932.0000 55.2000 A
Cisitu
 
31
 
2238.0000 72.1935 A B
Cilampuyang
 
33
 
3201.5000 97.0152 B
  
note: Letter A and B are a symbol for group which is the village having the 
same letter has the same group
Village
 
Number of 
respondents
 
Sum of small-
scale forest 
owner
 
Preserve small-
scale forests
 
If there is an 
incentive, the small-
scale forests
 
will be 
preserved
 
Sum of 
cropland 
owner
 
If there is an incentive, the 
cropland will be converted to 
small-scale forests
 
Cilengkrang
 
36
 
27
 
27
 
27
 
21
 
4
 
Ganjaresik
 
35
 
23
 
21
 
23
 
20
 
9
 
Cisitu
 
31
 
31
 
29
 
31
 
4
 
3
 
Cilampuyang
 
33
 
31
 
28
 
31
 
16
 
0
 
Sum  135 112  105  112  61  16  
Table 9  Community response if there are PES incentives for small-scale private forests
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environmental services are water users, among others, 
users of water supply company, irrigation users and 
Jatigede Reservoir authority. A non-structural institution 
of environmental services to be established based on West 
Java Provincial Regulation Numbered 5 Year 2015 can 
be a facilitator in the implementation of environmental 
services.  Existing community institutions can be 
empowered for managing the funds received from 
buyers.  The extension agents or third parties such as non-
governmental organizations can be assistant in 
implementing the PES mechanism
3 Valuation financing and costs: Payment mechanisms can 
be set forth in the form of cooperation agreements 
between environmental service providers and buyers of 
environmental services (service beneficiaries). The 
results of environmental services valuation can be used 
as a reference for both parties in negotiating. One 
approach that can be used is through the calculation of 
willingness to pay (WTP) of water company users. For 
example, the WTP of Tirta Medal Company users, 
company utilizing the Cimanuk river water, is 
-1 -1
IDR2,366,124 month  or IDR28,393,488 year
4 Operation and design: The type of environmental 
services is to maintain the quality and quantity of water 
through watershed protection. To maintain the quality 
and quantity of water can be done by (1) maintaining the 
existing small-scale private forests and (2) change the 
management of agricultural crops cultivation into 
agroforestry management. Incentives can be in form of 
c a s h  m o n e y  o r  a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
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Table 10 A review of suitability of community institution (farmers group) based on design principles institution by Ostrom (1990) 
to support the development of PES
Principle  Cimedang Farmers 
Group (Cilengkrang 
Village)  
Temu Hurip Farmers Group 
(Ganjaresik Village)  
Mekar Mandiri Farmers 
Group (Cisitu Village)  
Malar Wangi Group 
(Cilampuyang Village)
Clearly defined boundaries  YES: Land is private 
property, boundaries 
clearly defined  
YES: Land is private property, 
boundaries clearly defined  
YES: Land is private 
property, boundaries 
clearly defined  
YES: Land is private 
property, boundaries clearly 
defined 
 
Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules and local condition
 
YES: Distribution of 
programs/aid are 
adjusted to the area of 
land owned
 
YES: Distribution of programs 
/aid are adjusted to the area of 
land owned
 
YES: Distribution of 
programs/aid are adjusted  
to the area of land owned
 
YES: Distribution of 
programs/aid are adjusted to 
the area of land owned
Collective choice 
arrangements
 
YES: Policy 
arrangements are made 
by deliberation
 
YES: Policy arrangements are 
made by deliberation
 
YES: Policy arrangements 
are made by deliberation
 
YES: Policy arrangements 
are made by deliberation
 
 
 
 
Monitoring
 
YES: Monitoring 
conducted by aid 
providers 
 
YES: Monitoring conducted by 
aid providers and member’s 
annual meetings
 
YES: Monitoring 
conducted by aid providers 
and member’s annual 
meetings
 
YES: Monitoring conducted 
by aid providers and 
member’s annual meetings
Graduated sanction
 
YES: Members shall 
be subject to the rules 
of the farmer group
 
YES: Members shall be subject 
to the rules of the farmer group
 
YES: Members shall be  
subject to the rules of the 
farmer group
 
YES: Members shall be 
subject to the rules of the 
farmer group
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms
 
YES: Consensus 
decision mechanism
 
YES: Consensus decision 
mechanism
 
YES: Consensus decision 
mechanism
 
YES: Consensus decision 
mechanism
 
 
Minimal recognition of rights 
to organize
 
LESS: There is no 
official decision from 
the Ministry of Justice 
and Human Rights
 
YES: The farmer group is 
legalized through the Decree of 
Ganjaresik Village Head and 
Decree of the Minister of Law 
and Human Rights of the 
Republic of Indonesia
 
YES: The farmer group is 
legalized through the 
Decree of Cisitu Village 
Head and Decree of the 
Minister of Law and 
Human Rights of the 
Republic of Indonesia
 
YES: The farmer group is 
legalized through the Decree 
of the Minister of Law
and Human Rights of
the Republic of Indonesia
 
Nested enterprises YES: The core 
manager is a member 
of the farmer group
YES: The core manager is a 
member of the farmer group
 
YES: The core manager is 
a member of the farmer 
group
 
YES: The core manager is a 
member of the farmer group
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maintenance/development of small-scale forests, and 
economic empowerment activities to provide alternative 
sources of income.
5 Monitoring and evaluation of PES implementation can be 
done by non-structural institution.
Social capital and community institution to support the 
development of payment for environmental services 
Local norms and the existence of local leaders in the 
community are factors that can be harnessed for the success 
of the self-organized institution of the resource regime 
(Ostrom 2000). Local norms in land/forest utilization such as 
in hardwood planting around the springs and on land having 
high slopes, common knowledge about the environmental 
benefits of small scale forests and the existence of local 
leaders (religious leaders) trusted by the community, can 
serve as a bridge for the creation of collective action in the 
implementation of payment for environmental services 
scheme.  Suharti et al. (2016) stated that to achieve collective 
action, social capital should be activated through the 
intervention of symbolic power inherent in role models. 
 Collective action of the community has been reflected 
from the existence of community institutions of farmers 
(farmer groups) which is capable in facilitating collective 
actions such as facilitation and implementation for programs 
related to agriculture, forestry and livestock activities. 
Example of community institution existing in each village 
are Cimedang Farmer Group (Cilengkrang Village), Temu 
Hurip Farmer Group (Ganjaresik Village), Mekar Mandiri 
Farmer Group (Cisitu Village), and Malar Wangi Farmer 
Group (Cilampuyang Village). The number of group 
members was about 40 people, with its membership being 
voluntary. Generally, group members live within the same 
territory or have arable land within the same territory.  Land 
ownership of group members is private property, so the 
boundaries of the territory are clearly defined.
 Mutual trust among the people, high trust in religious 
leaders (local leaders) and mutual cooperation to assist 
various community activities are a characteristic of the 
community in the study sites. Participation in activities not 
only in the form of labor but also in the form of goods for 
example wood to build places of worship.  This is typical of 
communities having “bonding” social capital membership of 
farmer groups varies from age and education level 
(elementary to senior high school). Viewed from the 
frequency of group meetings, there were some variations. 
Cimedang Farmer Group and Mekar Mandiri Farmer Group 
had meetings in accordance with the needs of the activities to 
be carried out. Whereas Temu Hurip Farmer Group and 
Malar Wangi Farmer Group organized regular meetings once 
in a month and have other meetings when needed.  The 
participation level of the member groups was high. 
 Participation is one of the important dimensions that will 
affect the implementation of PES (Adhikari & Boag 2013).  
Active participation of communities in the development of 
project concepts, ecosystem infrastructure, and PES 
management frameworks plays an important role in the 
success of the PES scheme in Caura (Trinidad) (Rawlins & 
Westby 2013).  Furthermore, Adhikari and Boag (2013) 
found that the ability to participate in PES scheme can be 
influenced by household socio-economic characteristics, 
ownership structure, social dynamics, and strength of 
community relations and local institutional management. 
 Group policy arrangements at all farmer group in the 
research site (Cimedang, Temu Hurip, Mekar Mandiri, and 
Malar Wangi) are conducted through deliberation and active 
participation of group members. All members have the same 
voting rights. One form of collective choice is when the 
farmer groups get aid from the government then a 
deliberation is held to determine the distribution of aid and 
the way it works. If within the farmer's group working area 
there is land belonging to the members from other farmer 
groups, then the allocation of assistance such as seeds for the 
relevant land would be granted according to collective 
decision of the group members.
 Next, effectiveness possibility of the community 
institutions (farmers' groups) in managing the community 
forest resources is assessed based on the institutional design 
principles of Ostrom (1990), which include clearly defined 
boundaries, congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules and local condition, collective choice 
arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanction, conflict 
resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to 
organize, and nested enterprises (Table 10). Result from the 
research reveals that three farmer groups (Temu Hurip, 
Mekar Mandiri, and Malar Wangi) were qualified as 
community institutions for managing resources for PES 
scheme effectively, but not for Cimedang Farmer Groups 
which only meet 7 principles and could not meet one 
principle i.e. recognition of the right to organize.  From the 
research, it is found that this farmer group has not yet had a 
formal legal decision letter as a legal basis to regulate various 
activities.  Therefore, it is necessary for Cimedang Farmer 
Groups can immediately have legal entity as legal basis to 
organize various activities.
 The involvement of community institutions in the 
implementation of PES schemes is necessary to ensure that 
the environmental services payment scheme can be effective 
and have long-term prospects.  Rosa et al. (2004) stated that 
social organization is required negotiate successfully with 
intermediaries and external agents, and needed to deal with 
internal distribution issues and other conflicts. Research 
conducted by Clements et al. (2010) showed that PES 
initiatives in Cambodia with an approach relying on local 
institutions were initially ineffective compared to direct 
payments to individuals, although it was gradually 
strengthened and had stronger longer-term prospects.
Conclusion
Identification of potential social capital (trust, norm, 
network and civic engagement) is an important step to know 
the potential of collective action in resource management. 
The results of the study indicate that level of public trust to 
community local leaders is very high. This role model can be 
an entry point in introducing the payment for environmental 
services mechanism as well as initiating its action. There is 
common knowledge prevailing in the community that small 
scale forests are environmentally beneficial and societal 
norms related to the protection of springs can be the source of 
support for developing PES policies. Leadership and 
networking capability of group leader becomes an 
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opportunity as bridging social capital of the community to 
cooperate in realizing PES policy. The farmer group as one of 
the community institutions is a reflection of the potential of 
collective action where the farmer group can be empowered 
and strengthened to support the implementation of PES 
incentives.  Meanwhile, for the development of payment for 
environmental services in communities with relatively low 
social capital, active support from support organizations such 
as NGOs is required.  The agency plays an important role in 
providing technical, operational, and mediation assistance to 
other agencies or markets.
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